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DE RUEHC #5355 0952343  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 8636  
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 7167  
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 5409  
RUEHKE/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 5884  
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 7887  
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 9509  
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 1416  
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 9759  
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA IMMEDIATE 2431  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6803

UNCLAS STATE 045355

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SENSITIVE  
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KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [UNSC](#) [UNMIK](#) [PGOV](#) [YI](#) [EU](#)  
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ASSESSMENT OF KOSOVO POSITION

REF: A. STATE 024360

[1](#)B. STATE 42573

[1](#)1. (SBU) This is an action request for ambassadors in Accra, Brazzaville, Pretoria, Jakarta, Doha, Panama and Lima -- please see para 4.

[1](#)2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: On April 3, UN Special Envoy Marti Ahtisaari presented to the UNSC his proposals for Kosovo's future status, including a recommendation that Kosovo become independent, subject to a period of international supervision. As explained earlier (ref A and B), the U.S. supports Ahtisaari's recommendations and believes that independence for Kosovo is the only viable outcome. In the coming weeks, the U.S. and its European partners will present a new draft UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) to endorse Ahtisaari's recommendations and pave the way for Kosovo's independence. Russia remains opposed to any outcome that is not agreed to by both Serbia and Kosovo. Working with our European allies, we are reaching out to Moscow to overcome Russian objections.

[1](#)3. (SBU) BACKGROUND CONTINUED: During April 3 Security Council consultations, non-permanent UNSC members from Asia, Africa and Latin America expressed various concerns about Ahtisaari's recommendations, particularly the international law implications of Kosovo independence. It is critical that we line up affirmative votes from as many UNSC members as possible (Note: Legally nine affirmative votes and no vetos are required for the UN Security Council to approve a resolution; however a 9-6 vote would seem politically anemic. End note). We believe that positive positions from non-permanent members -- particularly bellwether states South Africa and Indonesia -- will be essential both to managing Russia and achieving eventual success on our resolution in the UNSC. We are therefore now planning for a period of aggressive engagement with these members, but need posts' advice on the best approach.

[1](#)4. (SBU) We appreciate the work that posts have done already to convey our message, as well as the concrete suggestions that posts have provided to Washington about how best to approach host governments. As we plan our outreach efforts, we now request from chiefs of mission even more specific tactical suggestions about when/where/how we should direct our efforts in the next four to six weeks. We request that

chiefs of mission send by Monday April 11 their thoughts (if not already provided) on:

-- any new information about the current position of the host government on Kosovo, including their stated objections and possible underlying factors behind their position;

-- the likelihood that the host government can eventually be brought around to support a new UNSCR on Kosovo that endorses Ahtisaari's recommendations;

-- an assessment of who will actually make the decision on whether to support a new UNSCR on Kosovo (e.g., head of state, foreign minister, etc.);

-- recommendations on the most useful approaches to influence host government's opinions (e.g., via New York UN missions, Washington embassies or MFAs, phone calls or visits from senior USG officials, other countries (or individuals) that might be persuasive to host governments), or other steps we could take that would make it easier for host governments to support our position on such a resolution;

-- advice on the best arguments to use with the host government (or arguments to avoid).

15. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT: Joshua Black, Kosovo Future Status Process coordinator, Office of South Central Europe, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (202-647-9173 or -blackj@state.gov) and Howard Betts, Office of UN Political Affairs at (202-647-0045 or in the GAL).  
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